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This paper exploits variation in kidnappings that target firm owners or managers in different 
regions of Colombia from 1996 to 2003 to study the relationship between violent crime and 
firm investment.  We find that firms invest less when kidnappings directly target firm 
owners or managers.  By contrast, firm investment is statistically unrelated to broader forms 
of violent crime that do not explicitly target firms—homicides, guerrilla attacks, and general 
kidnappings.  In addition, we find that investment at firms with substantial foreign 
ownership is particularly sensitive to kidnappings of foreign managers and owners.  Finally, 
kidnappings that target firm managers and owners reduce investment for firms that sell in 
local markets and also those that that sell in foreign markets.  Thus, an unobservable 
correlation between poor demand conditions and criminal activity is unlikely to explain the 
negative relationship between firm-related kidnappings and investment.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent cross-country studies suggest that crime hinders economic activity.  For example, using 
survey data for Latin America, Gaviria (2002) finds that firms located in countries where managers 
report that crime is an obstacle to doing business exhibit lower sales growth.  Similarly, Barro 
(1991) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) find that politically unstable countries grow more slowly and 
invest less.  Developing countries are simultaneously burdened by high crime rates and deficits in 
economic and social infrastructure, including health and education.  Hence, understanding the 
effect of crime on economic activity is central for debating priorities and strategies for 
development policy.  In addition, high rates of violent crime in developing countries may help 
researchers explain the puzzling result that capital does not appear flow from rich countries to poor 
countries (Lucas, 1990). 
 
Negative correlations between crime and investment in cross-country studies may be explained by 
omitted variables.  Importantly, poor economic conditions may simultaneously deter investment 
and increase incentives to commit crimes.  Instead of exploiting variation across countries, this 
paper uses variation of crime rates over time within regions in Colombia to understand the 
relationship between kidnappings and corporate investment rates.   
 
Colombia provides a useful setting for studying the economic consequences of violent crime, 
because it has experienced high levels of crime in recent decades.  The combination of guerrillas, 
paramilitaries, and drug trafficking has given Colombia the highest per capita rates of homicides 
and kidnappings in the world since the early 1990s.  Furthermore, there has been substantial 
variation in criminal activity both over time and across regions.  The total number of kidnappings 
in Colombia almost tripled from 1996 to 2000.
1  In 2002, Medellin, the second largest city, 
reported almost four times the number of homicides per capita of Bogota, the largest city.
2   
 
Our dataset combines detailed information about crime rates across 32 regions in Colombia with 
financial-statement data for an unbalanced panel of roughly 11,000 firms from 1997 to 2003.   
Using detailed data on the victims of kidnappings allows us to isolate crimes that affect firm 
                                                 
1 FONDELIBERTAD.  In section 3 we discuss a dataset on kidnappings in Colombia. 
2 Colombia’s National Police.   3
managers and owners from widespread forms of crime that victimize the entire population.  By 
comparing the effect of firm-related kidnappings with the effect of broader forms of violent crime, 
we are able to isolate the relationship between firm-related kidnappings and investment that is not 
explained by omitted variables that affect all forms of violent crime.    
 
Our main result is that firms invest less when kidnappings directly target firm owners or managers 
in the region where the firms are headquartered.  By contrast, forms of crime that victimize the 
entire population but that do not explicitly target firm owners or managers are statistically 
unrelated with corporate investment.  These results are not driven by the subset of firms whose 
managers and owners are actually kidnapped.  On the contrary, the negative relationship between 
firm-related kidnappings and firm investment is explained by the firms that are headquartered in 
the same region as the firms whose managers and owners are actually victimized.  In addition, we 
find that firms with substantial shares of foreign ownership appear to be more sensitive to the 
kidnappings of foreign managers and foreign owners.  Similarly, firm investment in a given 
industry is strongly negatively correlated with kidnappings of firm owners and managers within the 
industry but is unrelated with kidnappings in other industries.      
 
Focusing on firm-level data within a country allow us to exploit firm characteristics to address 
concerns that unobserved poor demand conditions explain a negative correlation between 
investment and crime.  In particular, we compare the effect of kidnappings on firms that sell on 
local markets and the effects on firms that rely on exports.  If omitted poor demand conditions 
explained the negative correlation between kidnappings and corporate investment, we should 
expect stronger effects for firms selling in local markets.  By contrast, we find similar effects in 
firms that sell in local markets and those that sell mostly in foreign markets, providing evidence 
against an explanation of the negative correlation between corporate investment and crime based 
on omitted demand variables.   
 
The results in this paper complement recent studies that exploit variation of crime rates within 
countries.  In particular, Abadie and Gardezabal (2003) show that terrorism reduces firms’ returns 
in the Basque Country using event-study methodologies.  Our findings complement their study, 
because we focus on firm-related crime and not on general forms of crime. 
   4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 illustrates the link between kidnappings 
and investment using a stylized cross-country regression.  Section 3 provides a brief historical 
background of Colombia and explains the dataset.  Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy, and 
section 5 reports our main results.  Section 6 compares alternative explanations for the negative 
effect of firm-related kidnappings on investment, and section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM CROSS-COUNTRY DATA 
 
As motivation for our subsequent analysis using data from Colombian firms, this section reports 
the results of simple cross-country regressions linking the rate of kidnappings by international 
terrorists with aggregate investment.  The rate of kidnappings by international terrorists is both 
closely related to the measures of violent crime we analyze for the Colombian case and available 
for a large panel of countries.  Other cross-country studies have studied the relationship between 
more general forms of crime and economic activity (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza, 2002; 
Gaviria, 2002), but none have explicitly focused on kidnappings.  
 
We measure investment as either Gross Capital Formation or net Foreign Direct Investment, both 
scaled by GDP.  We use an unbalanced panel of 196 countries with annual observations from 1968 
to 2002 to estimate pooled OLS regressions with country- and year-fixed effects:   
 
,, , 5 , αβ γ δ η ε − =+⋅ + ⋅ +++ it it it i t it Investment Kidnappings GDP per capita      (1), 
 
where i indexes countries, and t indexes years.  Investment, GDP, and population data are taken 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  Finally, Kidnappingsi,t is the number of 
kidnappings per 100,000 population perpetrated by international terrorists, reported in the 
ITERATE dataset.
3   
 
As a check on the influence of outliers, the regressions reported in this section exclude two 
country-year observations with net foreign direct investment larger than GDP and one observation 
with gross capital formation larger than GDP.  Similarly, the regressions reported in this section 
                                                 
3 ITERATE stands for International Terrorism:  Attributes of Terrorist Events.  Mickolus et al. (2003) 
describe the dataset in detail.   5
drop two country-year observations with kidnappings rates larger than 1 per 100,000 people.   
Results are similar when we keep these observations.  Our results are also robust to controlling for 
indexes of creditor rights protection as in La Porta et al. (1998)
4 and replacing kidnapping rates 
with their one-year lag. 
 
Table 1 reports the results of estimating equation (1) using our two alternative measures of 
investment.  The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is gross capital formation, while the 
dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is net foreign direct investment.  Columns 1 and 3 report the 
results of an OLS regression of investment on kidnappings and a constant with no other controls, 
while columns 2 and 4 add country- and year-fixed effects and lagged GDP. 
  
 [ Table 1] 
 
The results in Table 1 suggest that those countries where kidnappings are more frequent also tend 
to accumulate domestic capital more slowly and attract less foreign direct investment.  The 
evidence summarized in Table 1 is suggestive, but raises questions.  For example, the relationship 
between kidnappings and investment may be explained by omitted variables, as poor economic 
conditions may simultaneously depress investment and motivate criminal activity.  Credit 
conditions are tighter during recessions, as creditors anticipate more frequent defaults, and firms 
themselves, expecting lower sales, are reluctant to conduct capital expansions.  Meanwhile, 
recessions reduce employment opportunities in legal activities and accentuate income disparities, 
perhaps stimulating criminal activity.  In addition, cross-country regressions, like equation (1), 
cannot distinguish whether the negative relation between investment and violent crime is mainly 
concentrated on those households or firms that are direct victims of violent events, or whether the 
effects are more widely spread.   
 
The limitations of cross-country studies provide a major motivation for studying the link between 
violent crime and investment using more disaggregated data.  The rest of this paper discusses the 
relationship between violent crime and investment in the context of a large panel of firms located 
in Colombia.   
 
                                                 
4 The cost of including creditor right indexes is a sample reduction.   6
3.  DATA ON FIRMS AND CRIME IN COLOMBIA 
 
3.1.  Violent crime in Colombia in historical perspective 
 
Colombia is highly violent for its level of development.  For example, the United Nations reports 
that the annual rate of homicides in Colombia averaged 63 homicides per 100,000 people between 
1998 and 2000, the highest rate in the world.
5   By contrast, the average homicide rates in South 
America and the OECD countries were 41 per 100,000 people and 3 per 100,000 people, 
respectively. 
 
As measured by homicide rates, violent crime in Colombia has trended up for several decades 
before the years studied in this paper.  As Figure 1 illustrates, homicide rates rose sharply in the 
1940s, as the two main political parties waged a civil war.  Although these political parties agreed 
on an explicit power-sharing mechanism, higher homicide rates persisted into the 1960s, as some 
of the peasant resistance groups formed during the civil war evolved into leftist guerrillas like the 
Revolutionary Army Forces of Colombia (FARC), one the largest rebel groups currently active 
(Safford and Palacios, 2002).  Homicide rates skyrocketed in the 1980s and 1990s, as cocaine 
production surged (Angrist and Kugler, 2008; Bergquist, Peñaranda, and Sanchez, 2001).  Drug 
trafficking increased violence, as the government prosecuted drug lords, and different cartels 
fought for market control.  During the last decades of the 20th century, powerful economic 
interests—including drug dealers—organized right-wing groups of paramilitaries to protect their 





The dramatic rise in homicides during the 1980s and 1990s parallels increases in other measures of 
violent crime.  As Figure 2 illustrates, both kidnappings and guerrilla attacks rose steadily 
throughout the 1990s and peaked in 2000.
7   Kidnappings and guerrilla activity moved together, 
                                                 
5 United Nations, Seventh survey of crime trends and operations of criminal justice. 
6 Both guerrilla and paramilitaries have been linked with drug trafficking in recent years.  See, for example, 
Streatfeild (2002). 
7 Guerrilla attacks (FARC) include bombings, arm-trafficking, massacres, ambushes, piracy, and 
confrontation with the Army or the National Police.    7
likely because rebels use hostages to strengthen their political bargaining position and partly 
finance their operations with monetary ransoms.  Paramilitaries, drug cartels, and gangs are also 
frequently associated with kidnappings.  In News of a Kidnapping, for instance, Garcia Marquez 
reconstructs the story of seven hostages kidnapped in 1989 by the Medellin drug cartel to force the 
Colombian government into repealing its extradition treaty with the United States.  The cartel 
leaders were keenly interested in securing their trial and imprisonment in Colombia under more 
favorable terms.  After the increase in kidnappings during the 1990s, Colombia became the country 






The persistence of high rates of violent crime has motivated several studies measuring the cost of 
crime and conflict using Colombian data.
9  Using aggregate data, Rubio (1995) shows that 
increases in crime rates are correlated with lower GDP growth, and Cardenas (2007) argues that the 
acceleration in criminal activity in the 1990s is partly to blame for Colombia’s productivity 
slowdown.  More recently, using household level data, Barrera and Ibañez (2004) and Rodriguez 
and Sanchez (2009) study the effects of crime on education.  Similarly, exploiting variation in 
crime rates across municipality, Urdinola (2003) analyzes the effect of violent crime on infant 
mortality. 
 
3.2.  Statistics on Kidnappings and Other Types of Crime 
 
The statistics on violent crime in Colombia used in this paper are aggregated at the level of 
“department.”  Colombia is divided into 32 departments or semiautonomous administrative units.  
Colombian departments are similar to states in the United States, but have substantially less 
legislative autonomy.  FONDELIBERTAD, a governmental organization in Colombia established 
in 1996, collects detailed information on individual kidnappings reported to the Colombian 
                                                 
8 In 2003, Kroll, a private security advisor headquartered in New York, estimated that more kidnappings 
were perpetrated in Colombia (about 4,000 per year) than in other countries. Mexico followed with roughly 
3,000 kidnappings per year. 
9 Montenegro and Posada (2001) and Riascos and Vargas (2003) survey the literature on the costs of crime 
and violence in Colombia.  For a more recent treatment, see Sanchez (2007).   8
Ministry of Defense.
10  For each kidnapping event between 1996 and 2002, FONDELIBERTAD 
reports the date and department in which the kidnapping occurred, the identity of the kidnapper 
(guerrillas, paramilitaries, common criminals, or not determined), and the number of days in 
captivity.  Importantly for the regression analysis, the dataset reports the occupation and nationality 
of the victim.  For most victims with ownership or employment relationships with a firm, the 
dataset reports the name of the firm.  In the case of owners, however, the dataset does not report the 
fraction of ownership or whether the victim held stakes in several firms.  The dataset does not 
disclose information on monetary ransoms. 
 
The first 6 columns of Table 2 summarize the main characteristics of the FONDELIBERTAD 
dataset.  As shown in column 1, the dataset reports roughly 2,700 kidnappings per year between 
1996 and 2002.  
 
 [ Table 2] 
 
The dataset attributes 56 percent of overall kidnappings to guerrillas, 14 percent to common 
criminals, and 5 percent to paramilitaries.  (The identity of the kidnappers is unknown or not 
disclosed for the rest of the observations.)  According to the demands of the kidnappers, 
FONDELIBERTAD classifies abductions as having either economic or political objectives.   
Kidnappings for economic reasons typically involve a monetary ransom.  Just over half of the 
kidnappings in the sample are classified as having economic ends, while 10 percent of the 
kidnappings are classified as having political objectives.
11  As shown in column 2 of Table 2, only 
2 percent of the victims are not Colombian citizens.  
 
3.2.1.  Kidnappings and firms 
 
To focus on the subset of kidnappings that target firms, we define Kidnappings of Firm Owners, as 
those where victims own at least part of the firm; and Kidnappings of Firm Management, as those 
                                                 
10 FONDELIBERTAD is short for Fondo Nacional para la Defensa de la Libertad Personal (National Fund 
for the Protection of Individual Liberty).  In addition to collecting statistics on kidnappings, 
FONDELIBERTAD provides legal and psychological assistance to affected families, and advises 
government policies on kidnappings.  Publicly available FONDELIBERTAD data on kidnappings after 2003 
has been less detailed. 
11 The demands of the kidnappers are unknown for roughly a third of the observations.     9
where victims are board members, chief executive officers (CEOs), presidents, vice-presidents, or 
division managers.  Table 2 reports that just under 10 percent of the kidnappings in the 
FONDELIBERTAD dataset targeted firm management (Column 3), and about 1 percent targeted 
owners (Column 4).  
 
To compare the effects of kidnappings that target firms to other types of kidnappings, we consider 
two additional categories.  We define government employees as individuals who worked for the 
local or national government or candidates running for public office at the time of the kidnapping.  
We group members of the Army and National Police in a separate category, even though they are 
also government employees.  Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 report, respectively, that 5 percent of the 
victims in the FONDELIBERTAD dataset were government employees and that 3 percent of the 
victims served in the Army or the National Police. 
 
Finally, a large fraction of the victims in the dataset are under 18 (about 10 percent), self-employed 
workers (about 45 percent), and members of not-for-profit organizations such as religious 
communities and NGOs (about 5 percent).  Occupation is unknown for 12 percent of the 
observations in the dataset.  
 
3.2.2.  Other types of crime 
 
To isolate the effect of kidnappings on investment from the effect of overall violence, we consider 
variables other than kidnappings that reflect common crime activity or the armed conflict between 
government and rebels.  Based on reports from Colombia’s National Police and Army, the National 
Planning Department (DNP in Spanish) compiles a dataset on different types of crime by 
department since 1995.  We focus on two of the most common types of violent crime in Colombia:  
guerrilla attacks and homicides.  
 
As a limitation to our analysis, the data on kidnappings are more detailed than the data on guerrilla 
attacks and homicides are.  The FONDELIBERTAD dataset on kidnappings allows us to identify 
the victim and her occupation (and hence, whether she works for a firm).  By contrast, the DNP 
dataset on guerrilla attacks and homicides contains no information about individual victims within 
departments.     10
 
Guerrilla attacks in the DNP dataset include arm trafficking, massacres, bombings, ambushes, 
piracy, and confrontations with the Army or the National Police.  We restrict attention to attacks by 
FARC for two reasons.  First, by the number of combatants and terrorist attacks, FARC is the 
largest rebel group in Colombia.  Second, while other rebel groups operate only in a handful of 
departments, FARC is widely spread throughout the country.  Homicides reported by DNP include 
all kinds of violent deaths and not only killings related with the armed conflict.  Columns 7 and 8 
of Table 2 report the number of terrorist attacks and homicides from 1996 through 2002.  
 
The maps in Figure 3 illustrate the distribution of kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks per 
capita across departments in Colombia.
12  FARC are somewhat more likely to attack departments 
with a large fraction of rural population in the southeast of the country or departments with 
abundant natural resources (like rich-oil Arauca along the Venezuelan border).  By contrast, 
homicides and kidnappings are more evenly distributed across departments than guerrilla attacks.
13  




3.3.  Firms 
 
We combined balance sheet and income statement data for publicly-traded firms that report to the 
Superintendencia Financiera and for privately-owned firms in Colombia that report to the 
Superintendencia de Sociedades.  The Superintendencia Financiera is a government agency that 
oversees and regulates both banking and securities markets,
14 while the Superintendencia de 
Sociedades oversees incorporated firms and regulates liquidation and bankruptcy.  Combining 
                                                 
12 We exclude one department from the statistical analysis—the islands of San Andres and Providencia—
because there is no information on crime and other regional characteristics.  Additionally, we treat the 
metropolitan area of Bogota—known as the Capital District—as a separate department, because it 
concentrates roughly one fifth of Colombia’s population.  Data on population are described in Appendix 
Table 1. 
13 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that the quest for social justice is not the only cause behind rebellions:  
in fact, many rebellions pursue the capture of rents.  Diaz and Sanchez (2004) study the importance of these 
two types of causes for the location of FARC in Colombia. 
14 The financial reports from publicly-traded firms that we use in this paper were originally collected by the 
Superintendencia de Valores, which merged with the Superintendencia Bancaria in 2005 to form the 
Superintendencia Financiera.   11
these two datasets yields an unbalanced panel of almost 11,000 firms with annual observations 
between 1996 and 2003 (roughly 44,000 firm-year observations).   
 
Prior to 2000, reporting of financial statements to the Superintedencia de Valores was mandatory 
for all firms incorporated in Colombia.  After 2000 only firms with assets above an inflation-
indexed threshold are required to report, but a substantial number of firms below the threshold 
continued to voluntarily report after 2000.
15   
 
Table 3 summarizes the distribution of firms over time and across industries coded in the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC).  As it is the case in most developing 
countries, only a small fraction of firms in Colombia is publicly traded (Panel A).  Roughly half of 
the observations in the sample are from the manufacturing sector or from the wholesale and retail 





Table 4 summarizes the characteristics of the firms in the sample.
17  The average firm-year 
observation has real assets of $7.7 million, while the median firm has real assets of $2.3 million.  
As it is the case for firm data in other developing and industrialized countries, the sample is skewed 
towards smaller firms.  Investment, defined as the change in net Property, Plant, and Equipment 
(PPE), scaled by assets is -0.3 percent for the average observation and -0.5 percent for the median.  
Since our definition of investment captures capital expenditures net of depreciation, investment is 
not censored at zero.
18  Negative investment for the median and the average observation partly 
reflects the downturn experienced by the Colombian economy during most of the sample, which 
overlaps with the emerging market crisis of 1998.  The ratio of net income to total assets (Return 
on assets or ROA), a measure of profitability, is 0.1 percent for the average observation and 1.5 
percent for the median.  Finally, Table 4 also reports that foreign firms account for roughly 17 
                                                 
15 The dollar equivalent of the 2003 threshold was about $2 million.  The results in this paper are robust to 
excluding firms with asset values below the threshold during the entire sample.  
16 The results in the following sections are robust to excluding firms in heavily regulated industries (financial 
intermediation and utilities). 
17 Nominal variables are deflated using the Producer Price Index (PPI).  Appendix Table 1 describes all 
variables used in this section.  Total Assets are translated to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate in 1999, 
which is the base year of the PPI.  
18 We have no data on gross PPE or capital expenditures in the database.   12
percent of the sample.  Firms are classified as foreign if more than 50 percent of its shares are held 
by foreigners. 
   
 [ Table 4] 
 
The map in Figure 4 depicts the geographic distribution of the firms in the sample in 2003 and 
illustrates the high concentration of economic activity.  Most firms were headquartered in the 
northern (or Caribbean) departments or in the central (or Andean) departments.  Just a bit over half 
of the sample was headquartered in Bogota, D.C., and about one quarter of the sample was 
headquartered in the departments of Antioquia and Valle del Cauca, mainly in their capital cities 
(Medellin and Cali, respectively).
19  However, roughly a fifth of the sample was distributed in 21 
departments other than Bogota, Antioquia, and Valle del Cauca.  Only a small fraction of firms was 
headquartered in the northwestern department of Choco (close to the border with Panama) or in the 
southeastern departments (close the borders with Brazil and Peru), as their territory is largely 




4.  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
To measure the relationship between kidnappings and firm investment, our empirical strategy 
exploits two sources of variation.  First, we consider changes over time in kidnapping rates 
measured at the department-level.  Second, we compare the effect of kidnappings that target firm-
related individuals with the effect of other types of kidnappings (and also to other types of crime). 
 
To estimate the effect of the kidnappings rate of department j on the investment of all firms located 
in that department, we control for characteristics of department j that may affect both investment 
decisions and incentives to kidnap.  Additionally, we control for firm characteristics that predict 
investment behavior. 
 
                                                 
19 Our results are similar when we exclude firms located in Bogota, D.C.   13
In the traditional “crime and punishment” approach, individuals decide to commit crimes after 
weighting the costs and benefits of criminal behavior (Becker, 1968; Glaeser, 1999).  For example, 
adverse economic conditions reduce the opportunity cost of criminal activities.  Supportive of this 
prediction, Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2002) find that crime rates are counter-cyclical and 
Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) show that negative exogenous shocks in economic growth 
increase the likelihood of civil conflict in a sample of African countries.
20  Hence, economic 
conditions in department j may determine not only the investment decisions of firms in department 
j, but also the incentives of kidnappers in department j.  In our statistical analysis, we control for 
GDP per capita, poverty levels, public infrastructure, and primary school enrollment.
21  
 
We include homicides and guerrilla attacks in our regressions, because we do not want to confound 
the effect of kidnappings with the effect of the overall civil conflict.  To the extent that omitted 
variables affect all types of crime in a similar way, we identify the effect of crime on firm 
investment from the differential effect of crime specifically targeted against firms.
22 
 
Empirical studies of corporate investment typically find that firms with higher holdings of liquid 
assets (or cash) and more favorable investment opportunities (or Tobin’s Q) invest more (Fazzari, 
Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988; Stein, 2003).  In line with these standard results, we control for cash 
balances scaled by assets and approximate investment opportunities by using net income scaled by 
assets.  Unfortunately, forward-looking proxies for investment opportunities, such as price-to-book 
ratios, are available only for the small subset of publicly-traded firms in the sample.  
 
We measure the impact of kidnappings on firm investment using the following pooled OLS 
regression:   
 
                                                 
20 Recent studies challenge the conventional view that poverty generates terrorism.  For example, Abadie 
(2006) finds that terrorist risk is not significantly higher in poor countries, after controlling for country 
characteristics (including political freedom).   
21 Appendix Table 1 describes department-specific variables. 
22 Recent developments in the economics of crime suggest that social interactions explain an important 
component of the variance of crime both across cities and over time (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman, 
1996; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999).  In a framework where social interactions are important, the incentives 
to kidnap may depend on the intensity of other types of crime in the same time and place.   14
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where i indexes firms, j indexes departments, t indexes years, and k indexes industries.  Investment 
is defined as the change in property, plant, and equipment; and TA denotes total assets.   
Kidnappings, Guerrilla Attacks, and Homicides are measured at the department level and scaled by 
100,000 people.  Xi,t denotes the vector of firm-specific controls:  log of total assets, cash holdings 
scaled by total assets, and net income scaled by total assets.  Similarly, Zj,t represents the vector of 
department controls:  income per capita, primary school enrollment, a poverty index,
23 and the 
extension of roads in 1995.   i φ ,  t η ,  k λ , and  j μ  represent firm, year, industry, and department fixed 
effects, respectively.  Finally, standard errors are clustered by department.
24 
 
We assume that lagged crime rates are good predictors of future crime rates (and hence, future 
conditions that are potentially relevant for investment).  In fact, univariate time series analysis that 
we do not report here suggests that the rates of kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks are 
autoregressive and stationary processes.  Furthermore, crime rates in subsequent years are 
positively correlated.
25   
 
5.  RESULTS 
 
5.1.  Kidnappings that target firms 
 
Table 5 reports OLS estimates of equation (2) using alternative types of kidnapping rates as 
explanatory variables.  The first three regressions in the table consider kidnappings whose victims 
are not directly linked to firms, and the last two regressions consider kidnappings whose victims 
are firm managers or owners.   
 
                                                 
23 The index is Necesidades Basicas Insatifechas (NBI) and reflects crowded or substandard housing 
conditions, schooling-age children not attending school, and/or lower education of the head of the household.  
24 Results are robust to clustering by year-department. 
25 Results are robust to using contemporary kidnappings as opposed to lagged kidnappings and to instrument 
contemporary kidnappings with lagged kidnappings.   15
[Table 5] 
 
Kidnappings that target firm owners or managers have a statistically significant negative 
relationship with corporate investment.  To illustrate the economic magnitude of the relationship of 
firm-related kidnappings, note that a one-standard deviation decrease within a department in the 
rate of kidnappings victimizing firm management is associated with an average increase of about 
1.7 percentage points in investment rates (= -1.332*1.30).
26  This is a sizeable effect, as the average 
investment rate in the sample is about -0.3 percent of total assets.  Similarly noticeable magnitudes 
arise when we rank regions into quartiles based on the rate of kidnappings of firm management and 




By contrast, kidnappings whose victims are not directly related to firms have a statistically 
insignificant relationship with corporate investment.  In particular, kidnappings that target 
government employees, or the Army and National Police are unrelated to investment.  Although a 
few of these coefficients are large, they are imprecisely estimated.  In addition, the coefficient on 
total kidnappings is also not statistically significant. 
 
In sum, while kidnappings that target firm owners or managers have a statistically significant 
relationship with firm investment, other—more general—types of violent crime that do not target 
firms directly have no significant relationship with investment.  This finding alleviates concerns 
that our results with firm-related kidnappings may be explained by unobserved variables that drive 
both overall criminal activity and investment.
28  The identifying assumption in equation (2) is that 
unobserved variables have no differential effect across different types of crime.  For example, if 
economic conditions that are not captured by GDP affect both criminal activity and corporate 
investment, we assume that all types of crime are equally affected by such economic conditions.
29    
 
                                                 
26 Appendix Table 2 reports summary statistics of the series of kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks. 
27 Comparing firms in the most violent quartile with firms the least dangerous quartile is equivalent to 
comparing firms in Antioquia (where infamous Medellin drug cartel operated in the 1980s and 1990s) with 
firms in Bogota, D.C. 
28 For example, we are unable to observe attitudes towards crime, the effectiveness of local courts and local 
police, which are likely to affect incentives of both firms and kidnappers. 
29 As an illustration, we assume kidnappings of government employees and kidnappings of managers are 
equally countercyclical.     16
5.2.  Firms directly affected 
 
A finding that firms directly attacked by kidnappings are forced to cut back on investment would 
be, to some extent, unsurprising.  After all, kidnappings of employees disrupt production and firms 
may be forced to pay ransoms.  However, we find a more surprising—and perhaps more 
interesting—result:  the negative effects of firm-related kidnappings on investment decisions go 
beyond the subset of firms directly affected; firms that face a high risk of kidnappings reduce 
investment even when their own employees are not victims of kidnappings.  Potentially, the 
indirect effect is more harmful for aggregate industrial activity than the direct effect, because it 
spills over to a larger group of firms.  
 
Of all the kidnappings in the FONDELIBERTAD dataset, we classify 1,570 as targeting a firm 
manager or owner (Table 2).  Of this sample of firm-related kidnappings, we are able to identify 
the specific firm involved and match it to our sample for roughly 600 firm-year observations, less 
than 1 percent of the sample.  Table 6 reports the results of separately estimating equation (2) for 
two groups of firms:  (i) firms whose managers or owners were themselves victims of kidnappings, 




Importantly, kidnappings of firm owners and managers have a significant impact on firms that have 
not been directly affected.  The impact on the subset of victimized firms is larger in magnitude but 
not statistically significant, perhaps because the estimation is based on a considerably smaller 
sample.  The evidence in Table 6 suggests that the negative relationship between corporate 
investment and kidnappings of firm owners and managers and investment is not explained by the 
inclusion of firms whose employees are victims of kidnappings.   
 
5.3.  Kidnappings in the same industry and kidnappings in other industries 
 
If firm managers and owners make investment decisions based on their perceived conditional 
probability of being kidnapped, the most relevant kidnappings for a firm manager working on a 
given industry will likely be those occurring in the same line of business.  Firms within a given   17
industry are generally better informed about competitive conditions within their own industry, and 
well-organized industry groups typically promote the sharing of information about common 
problems or challenges.  To test this conjecture, we estimate the following regression:   
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     (3), 
 
where X, φ, η, λ, and μ are defined as in equation (2).  For notational convenience, the vector of 
department controls is expanded to include homicides and guerrilla attacks and relabeled Z % .  
Kidnappings Same Industryj,k,t represents the number of kidnappings of firm managers or owners in 
industry k in departments other than j.  Kidnappings Other Industriesj,k,t represents the number of 
kidnappings of firm managers or owners in all industries other than k and in all departments other 
than j, scaled by the number of industries.
30  More formally:   
 
   - 
1
   - 
(   )





Kidnappings Same Industry Firm Related Kidnappings










Panel A in Table 7 reports the results of estimating equation (3) by OLS.  Only firm-related 
kidnappings within an industry have a statistically significant negative relationship with the 
investment of firms in that industry.  The magnitude of the coefficients is not comparable to those 
in previous tables, because kidnappings are not scaled by 100,000 population, as we aggregate 




                                                 
30 Industrial activity tends to cluster by regions.  Hence, to avoid confusing the effect of kidnappings in the 
same department with the effect of kidnappings in the same industry, we exclude observations in the same 
department in the definitions of own-industry kidnappings and other-industry kidnappings.   18
The result that own-industry kidnappings have larger effects than kidnappings in other industries is 
consistent with various explanations.  First, rational and fully informed CEOs make corporate 
decisions based on the conditional probability of being kidnapped; hence, when other managers in 
the same industry are kidnapped, CEOs perceive a larger probability of victimization.   
Alternatively, less than fully informed CEOs are more likely to share information (or have a 
common source of information) with CEOs in the same industry; hence, they only revise the 
probability of kidnappings upwards when the victim is someone they know or someone they can 
identify themselves with. 
 
5.4. Foreign firms and kidnappings of foreign citizens 
 
Kidnappings of foreign owners or foreign managers are likely to be more relevant for foreign 
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     (4), 
 
where Kidnappings Foreigners is the rate of firm-related kidnappings with non-Colombian victims 
scaled by 100,000 population, and firm-related kidnappings are defined as those victimizing firm 
management or firm owners.  Foreign Ownership is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms with 
more than 50 percent of foreign ownership.  The definition of all other variables follows equation 
(3).  
 
Panel B of Table 7 reports OLS estimates of the coefficient on kidnappings of foreign owners or 
managers and its interaction with the foreign ownership indicator in equation (4).  The estimate 
reported in Panel B suggests that foreign firms are significantly more sensitive to kidnappings of 
foreign citizens than Colombian firms are.  The large standard error for the estimate of the marginal   19
effect of foreign kidnappings for firms with foreign ownership reflects the relatively small number 
of firms with substantial foreign ownership (Table 4). 
 
5.5. Limitations of the analysis 
 
The estimates of the relationship between firm-related kidnappings and firm investment reported in 
this section may be biased due to sample selection.  An important investment decision of firms is 
whether to continue operating at all.  In fact, shutting down the firm is the extreme form of 
disinvestment.  Unfortunately, we are not able to properly identify firm exit, and our sample 
consists of active firms.  If surviving firms invest more than exiting firms and firms exit more 
frequently from violent regions, our estimates of the effect of firm-related kidnappings on 
investment are biased towards zero.  The importance of entry and exit decisions is hard to assess 
with our data, because Superintendencia de Sociedades exempted some smaller firms from 
mandatory reporting in 2000.  Thus, not all firms that stopped reporting in 2000 shut down.   
 
As a second important limitation of our analysis, we are only able to observe a link between 
individuals and firms for owners and managers.  We are not able to identify kidnappings that 
victimize relatives of firm owners and managers.  The effect of this limitation may be non-
negligible, as 10 percent of victims in the FONDELIBERTAD dataset are children or teenagers, 
who might be related to firm managers, or owners. 
 
In addition, our estimates of the relationship between investment and firm-related kidnappings may 
be biased because of non-random allocation of kidnappings across regions and firms.  For example, 
if kidnappers target owners or managers of firms with larger cash holdings, and firms are likely to 
use them to pay ransoms, we should expect the estimates of the coefficient on firm-related 
kidnappings to be biased towards zero, since cash-abundant firms tend to invest more than 
financially constrained firms.  However, it seems plausible that kidnappers target individuals based 
on their own wealth, rather than based on financial information of the firm they work for or they 
own.  Unfortunately, we cannot determine with the available information whether firms really use 
their own cash to pay ransoms for their managers or owners.   
   20
Although most kidnappings in Colombia pursue economic objectives, guerillas, paramilitaries, and 
drug lords have exploited kidnappings for political reasons too.  In the early 1990s, for example, 
drug-dealers kidnapped the relatives of the Colombian political and business elite with the purpose 
of pressing the government to revoke an extradition treaty with the United States (Garcia Marquez, 
1997; Bowden, 2002).  More recently, businessmen, majors, soldiers, and even presidential 
candidates have been abducted to negotiate the release of imprisoned FARC rebels.  
 
Since crime rates are far higher in Colombia than in most other countries, it may be argued that the 
evidence presented here is not representative of the effect of crime on investment.  Colombia is, 
however, similar in various dimensions to other countries that experience high crime rates.  For 
example, according to the United Nations, four out of the ten most violent countries in terms of per 
capita homicides are Latin American.
31  In addition, the average GDP per capita of the ten most 
violent places is, in 2000 US dollars, 7,340, while the average GDP per capita of Colombia is 
6,340.
32  As many developing countries experience high rates of violent crime, the findings in this 
section suggest that crime may explain why capital does not flow to poor countries. 
 
6.  POTENTIAL CHANNELS 
 
This section uses firm and industry characteristics to evaluate the evidence for three mechanisms 
through which crime may deter investment.  First, kidnappings may reduce demand for goods and 
services:  during violent periods, households may decide to consume fewer goods or services if 
consuming them is dangerous (for example, dining out or going to a shopping center), or even to 
migrate to safer regions.  Firms that expect demand to decrease may, as a consequence, invest less.  
We call this mechanism the demand channel. 
 
Second, firms that face a high probability of being victimized by kidnappings may face tighter 
financial constraints, if financial institutions are reluctant to finance firms when money can be 
diverted to unproductive activities, like paying ransoms.  In addition, banks will deliberately stay 
out of a region during violent times to protect their owners and employees.  In developing 
                                                 
31 United Nations, Seventh Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice.  It covers the period 
1998-2000.  The countries with the ten highest rates of homicides are, in order:  Colombia, South Africa, 
Jamaica, Venezuela, Russia, Mexico, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Belarus. 
32 World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2002.   21
countries, where capital markets are not fully developed, banks provide most of the external 
finance raised by firms.  We call this hypothesis the credit constraints channel.  
 
Finally, kidnappings may increase the cost of doing business:  firms in regions with high 
kidnapping rates face higher security costs, such as bodyguards, armored cars, and intelligence 
services.  Private security firms in Mexico, for instance, estimate that large firms spend between 
20,000 and 30,000 dollars per month to protect their executives from kidnappings.  We call this 
hypothesis the cost channel. 
 
6.1. Demand Channel 
 
The results in section 5 hint that the mechanism through which kidnappings reduce investment is 
likely not a fall in demand, because the baseline regressions control for GDP at the department 
level.  The additional evidence in this section is also inconsistent with the demand channel.  In 
particular, we compare the response of firms that depend on Colombian markets with the response 
of firms that sell to foreign markets. 
 
If kidnappings reduce investment through a decrease in local consumption, investment by firms 
that have access to alternative markets should be less sensitive to firm-related kidnappings than 
investment by firms that sell in local markets only.  Firms that sell in foreign markets may be able 
to shift production to foreign markets when local demand falls.   
 
Table 8 compares the effect of firm-related kidnappings on firms that operate in industries that 
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where Industry Tradability is the fraction of exports in total sales for each 4-digit ISIC industry 
code.
33  All other definitions follow equation (3).  The interaction terms between industry 
tradability and kidnappings of firm owners and managers are statistically insignificant, which is 
hard to reconcile with the demand channel.  More important, the absence of a differential effect for 
firms that depend exclusively on local markets alleviates the concern that our results may be driven 
by omitted demand variables.       
 
 [ Table 8] 
 
6.2. Credit Constraints Channel 
 
Since the markets for corporate bonds and equity in Colombia are thin, the most common form of 
external financing in Colombia is bank debt.  Banks may be reluctant to lend to firms 
headquartered in regions with high rates of violent crime.  If kidnappings that target firms reduce 
investment through a tightening in credit constraints, firms should contract less bank debt when 
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where the vector of firm controls has been expanded to include property, plant, and equipment 
scaled by total assets, and all other definitions follow equation (3).
34  The credit constraints channel 
predicts that the coefficient associated with kidnappings is negative.  Table 9 reports the results of 
estimating equation (6) by OLS.  The dependent variable in the regression is the change in bank 
debt scaled by assets.  The coefficients associated with kidnappings of firm owners and firm 
managers are negative but statistically insignificant, providing rather weak evidence that firms 
contract less debt when kidnappings target firms.   
 
                                                 
33 For each 4-digit ISIC industry code, we average the tradability measure from 1991 to 1995 (before the first 
year in our sample).  Appendix Table 1 provides additional details. 
34 The regression follows the specification of Rajan and Zingales (1995) in their study of capital structure of 
firms located in industrialized countries.   23
[Table 9] 
 
6.3. Cost Channel 
 
If kidnappings increase security costs, firms that face high kidnappings rates should report larger 
administrative expenses.  Table 10 summarizes the results of running a regression similar to 
equation (2), with administrative expenses scaled by assets as dependent variable.  We use the 
same regional controls as in equation (2).  We use similar firm-specific controls as in equation (2), 
but return on assets is replaced by sales over assets.
35  Finally, as a proxy for industry 




The coefficients associated with the kidnapping rates of firm owners and firm managers are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that the effect of kidnappings on investment is 
not likely explained by increased administrative costs.  Our evidence on the cost channel is not 
conclusive, because we cannot observe what fraction of administrative costs corresponds to 




The evidence in this paper is consistent with the hypothesis that firms are reluctant to invest when 
their owners and managers are afraid of becoming victims of kidnappings.  A number of different 
mechanisms may explain the negative effect of firm-related kidnappings on corporate investment.  
The fact that administrative costs and bank debt are not negatively affected by kidnappings of firm 
owners and firm managers provides no evidence for mechanisms operating through credit or 
through costs of protection.  Very importantly, the evidence in this section suggests that firm-
related kidnappings have no differential effect on the investment of firms that depend on sales to 
local markets, thus buttressing our identification strategy.  If omitted demand variables explained 
the negative correlation between firm-related kidnappings and corporate investment, one should 
expect a more negative correlation for firms that sell their products in local markets. 
                                                 
35 Administrative costs likely depend of gross revenue and not of net income.   24
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we exploit variation in different forms of crime within regions in Colombia to 
measure the negative effect of violent crime on investment under identifying assumptions that are 
less restrictive than those typically used in cross-country studies.  First, unobserved institutional 
characteristics and crime reporting standards vary more widely across countries than within 
countries.  Second, we are able to observe different types of crime and identify whether firms are 
directly attacked by crimes.  To the extent that omitted variables affect all types of crime in a 
similar way, we are able to compare the effect of firm-related crimes on investment with the effect 
of more general forms of crime that do not necessarily target firms.  Finally, we exploit cross-
sectional differences in firm characteristics to address plausible omitted variables stories.  In 
particular, we use the industry’s export share to identify firms that depend exclusively on 
Colombian demand and firms that sell in foreign markets.  Under the assumption that foreign 
markets are less affected by kidnappings in Colombia, the differential effect of firm-related 
kidnappings on firms that depend on Colombian demand signals the importance of omitted demand 
variables. 
 
We find that kidnappings that directly target firm managers or firm owners have a statistically and 
economically significant negative effect on firm-level investment.  By contrast, general forms of 
crime—such as overall homicides and kidnappings—do not have a significant effect on investment.  
This second finding suggests that the negative effect of firm-related kidnappings on investment is 
not driven by omitted variables common to all forms of crime.  We also find that firm-related 
kidnappings affect industries that sell in Colombian markets as well as industries that sell in foreign 
markets, alleviating the concern that unobservable demand variables explain our basic result.  The 
distribution of violence and kidnappings in Colombia is not truly random.  Therefore, we the causal 
effect of violent crime on investment is not fully identified in our empirical strategy.   
 
This paper presents evidence suggesting that firm-related kidnappings reduce investment, because 
managers operate under the distraction of fear.  Individuals are not only scared because of the 
probability of expropriation, but also because of threats to their personal security.  We provide   25
evidence suggesting that the mechanism is unlikely to operate through demand conditions, credit 
constraints, or administrative costs.    
 
Recent empirical studies show that institutions that protect property rights foster investment and 
long-run economic growth (Besley, 1995; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Easterly and 
Levine, 1997, 2003).  One of the most important issues for institutional design and policy reform is 
to understand what specific aspects of property rights are relevant for economic development 
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).  The empirical challenge, therefore, is to dismantle the black box 
of property rights.  Similarly, the results in this paper suggest that crime may have significant 
effects on investment.  However, crime threatens both property rights and personal security.  Our 
findings suggest that both the security of property rights and personal security are important 
concerns for investors.  The challenge for future research, therefore, is to understand what forms 
and aspects of crime are particularly relevant for economic activity and investment.   
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Source:  National Police, Departmento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística de 
Colombia (DANE), and Sanchez, Diaz, and Formisano (2003). 
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Source:  National Police, Ministry of Defense, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de 
Estadística de Colombia (DANE), and Sanchez, Diaz, and Formisano (2003). 
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Panel A:  Kidnappings 
 
   
 
        More than 25 Kidnappings per 100,000 people         
           Between 9 and 24.9 Kidnappings per 100,000 people      
        Between 5 and 8.9 Kidnappings per 100,000 people             
           Between 1 and 4.9 Kidnappings per 100,000 people             
        Fewer than 1 Kidnapping per 100,000 people      
 
 
Note:  Panel A of Figure 3 shows the distribution of average kidnapping rates (1996-2002) across 
Colombia’s departments. Darker areas represent departments with higher kidnapping rates.    32
 








               More than 90 Homicides per 100,000 people       
                  Between 60 and 89.9 Homicides per 100,000 people 
               Between 40 and 59.9 Homicides per 100,000 people 
                  Between 10 and 39.9 Homicides per 100,000 people 
        Fewer than 10 Homicides per 100,000 people 
 
 
Note:  Panel B of Figure 3 shows the distribution of average homicide rates (1996-2002) across 
Colombia’s departments. Darker areas represent departments with higher homicide rates.     33
Figure 3:  Distribution of Violence across Departments (contd.) 
 
 
Panel C:  Guerrilla Attacks (FARC) 
 
 
    
More than 12 guerrilla attacks per 100,000 people 
Between 8 and 11.9 guerrilla attacks per 100,000 people 
Between 3 and 7.9 guerrilla attacks per 100,000 people 
Between 1 and 2.9 guerrilla attacks per 100,000 people 
Fewer than 1 guerrilla attack per 100,000 people 
 
 
Note:  Panel C of Figure 3 shows the distribution of average guerrilla attacks per capita (1996-
2002) across Colombia’s departments. Darker areas represent departments with higher guerrilla 
attacks per capita.     34




Total:  6,727 firms 
    
More than 1,000 firms (1 department:  Bogota, D.C. 3,809)   
Between 200 and 999 firms (3 departments:  Atlantico, 292, Valle del Cauca, 
782, Antioquia, 975) 
Between 50 and 199 firms (7 departments) 
Between 1 and 99 firms (12 departments) 
Departments with no firms (9 departments) 
 
 
Note:  Figure 4 shows the distribution of firms across Colombia’s departments in 2003. Darker 
areas represent departments with more firms.     35
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )





(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
Kidnappings -14.104** -17.709* -38.989** -17.198**
per 100,000 people i,t -1 (6.621) (10.208) (17.480) (8.263)
log (GDP per capita) i,t-5 0.213 -0.309
(0.648) (1.262)
Constant 2.223*** -0.039 23.056*** 25.330***
(0.192) (4.699) (0.479) (9.325)
Country Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes
Observations 3,688 3,688 4,019 4,019
Number of countries 160 160 172 172
R-squared 0.001 0.350 0.003 0.551
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for country clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This table reports the OLS estimate of the effect of kidnappings on investment in an unbalanced panel of 196 countries
from 1968 to 2002, corresponding to equation (1) in the text. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is net
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) scaled by GDP, and the dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is Gross Capital
F o rm a t io ns ca l edb yG D P . Th ev a ri a b leKidnappings is obtained from the ITERATE dataset; it is defined as the number
of kidnappings by international terrorists divided by 100,000 population. The series of Net FDI, Gross Capital
Formation, and GDP per capita are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators dataset. We exclude country-
year observationsfor which Net FDI (2 observations) or Gross Capital Formation (1 observation) is larger than the GDP.
Similarly, we exclude 2 country-year observations for which the rate of kidnappings is larger than one.
Table 1:  Cross-Country Evidence
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year Total Kidnappings Kidnappings of 
Foreigners
Kidnappings of Firm 
Management
Kidnapping of Firm 
Owners
1996 1,091 41 193 1
1997 1,671 31 205 0
1998 3,023 43 371 32
1999 3,349 57 470 77
2000 3,697 42 NA NA
2001 3,050 49 168 60
2002 2,986 31 163 43
TOTAL 18,867 294 1,570 213
(5) (6) (7) (8)




Army and National 
Police
Total Homicides Total Guerrilla 
Attacks
1996 23 24 26,130 934
1997 442 38 24,828 1,146
1998 280 266 22,673 790
1999 98 168 23,820 736
2000 NA NA 25,859 1,931
2001 84 68 27,356 1,471
2002 112 57 28,363 1,210
TOTAL 1,039 621 179,029 8,218
Table 2:  Kidnappings, Homicides, and Guerrilla Attacks by Year
This table reports, by year, the total number of kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks in Colombia from 1996
to2002. Dataon homicides and guerrilla attacks are fromthe National Police/MinistryofDefense. Guerrillaattacks
considers only attacks perpetrated by FARC. Data on kidnappings are obtained from FONDELIBERTAD. Total 
Kidnappings are all kidnappings reportedinthe FONDELIBERTAD dataset. Government Employees include local
and national government, except the Army and National Police . Kidnappings of Firm Management victimize CEOs,
presidents, vicepresidents, board members, and division managers. Kidnappings of Firm Owners include those
victims who own at least part of the firm. 
Kidnappings, Homicides, and Guerrilla Attacks by Year
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Total
1997 6,700 115 6,815
1998 7,153 67 7,220
1999 6,870 73 6,943
2000 7,139 75 7,214
2001 4,767 77 4,844
2002 4,448 94 4,542
2003 6,648 79 6,727
TOTAL 43,725 580 44,305
Agriculture, hunting, and forestry 3,892
Fishing 126
Mining and quarrying 859
Manufacturing 12,233
Electricity, gas, and water supply 67
Construction 4,391
Wholesale and retail trade 11,540
Hotels and restaurants 766
Transport, storage, and communications 2,122
Financial intermediation 2,237
Real estate, renting and business activities 4,936
Public administration and defence 0
Education 73
Health and social work 161
Other community, social, and personal service activities 883
Private households with employed persons 19
Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 0
TOTAL 44,305
PANEL B. Distribution by Industry (Firm-Year Observations)
PANEL A: Number of Firms
Table 3:  Distribution of Firms
Panel A reports the distribution byy e a r of firms in the sample. Data on private firms are
c o ll e ct e dbyt h eSuperintendencia de Sociedades in Colombia; data on public firms are obtained
from the Superintendencia Financiera. Panel B reports the distribution of firm-year
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Total Assets (millions of dollars) 7.700 2.308 19.693 44,305
Investment / TA (%) -0.337 -0.516 16.928 44,305
Return on Assets (%) 0.114 1.555 12.175 44,305
Real Cash / TA (%) 6.639 2.696 10.262 44,305
Foreign Ownership (Yes=1, No=0) 0.173 0.000 0.340 33,600
Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics:  Firms' Characteristics
This table reports descriptive statistics for the firm variables used in the empirical analysis, corresponding to
the sample summarized in Table 3. Investment is the change in Property, Plant, and Equipment, and TA
denotes Total Assets. Returns on Assetsis the ratio of net income to total assets. The dummy variable Foreign
Ownership equals 1 if foreigners own at least 50 percent of the firm.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Kidnappings 0.027
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.078)
Kidnappings of Government  0.575
Employees per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.691)
Kidnappings of Army and -0.570
National Police per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.592)
Kidnappings of Firm Management -1.332**
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.496)
Kidnappings of Firm Owners -4.105*
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (2.068)
Homicides -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Guerrilla Attacks -0.065 -0.210 -0.216 -0.199 -0.219
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.115) (0.259) (0.247) (0.251) (0.241)
Observations 44,305 39,461 39,461 39,461 39,461
Number of firms 10,957 10,877 10,877 10,877 10,877
R-squared 0.994 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for department clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5:  Kidnappings and Firm Investment
Thistable reports OLS estimates of the effect on investment of kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks. The results correspond to
equation (2) in the text. The dependent variable is the change in Property, Plant, and Equipment scaled by lagged assets. Regressions
include lagged firm controls (log assets, cash holdings scaled by assets, and ROA); lagged department controls (GDP per capita, primary
school enrollment, a poverty index, and the extension of roads in 1995); and fixed effects (by year, industry, department, and firm). The
rates of kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks are measured at the department level and are scaled by 100,000 population. The
sample is an unbalanced panel of firms located in Colombia with annual observations from 1996 to 2003. Total Kidnappings are all
kidnappings reported in the FONDELIBERTAD dataset. Government Employees include local and national government, except the
Army and the Nacional Police. Firm Management includes board members, CEOs, presidents, vice-presidents, and division managers.
Firm Owners are victims who own at least part of the firm. Guerrilla Attacks includes FARC attacks reported by the National
Police/Ministry of Defense.
Dependent Variable:  Investment t / Total Assets t -1
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(1) (2)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top -10.645
Management per 100,000 pop.  t -1 (7.476)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners -15.944
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (23.580)
Homicides 0.072 0.046
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.056) (0.054)
Guerrilla Attacks -0.973 -1.229
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.592) (0.718)
Observations 628 628
Number of firms 150 150
R-squared 0.275 0.273
(1) (2)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top -1.186**
Management per 100,000 pop.  t -1 (0.461)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners -3.942*
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (1.960)
Homicides 0.002 0.002
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.010) (0.009)
Guerrilla Attacks -0.170 -0.188
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.246) (0.236)
Observations 38,833 38,833
Number of firms 10,727 10,727
R-squared 0.995 0.995
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for department clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
PANEL B:  Firms not Directly Affected by Kidnappings
Dependent Variable:  Investment t / Total Assets t -1
Table 6:  Direct and Indirect Effects
This table reports OLS estimates of the effect of kidnappings on investment, corresponding to equation (2) in the text. The
dependent variable is the change in Property, Plant, and Equipment scaled by lagged assets. Regressions include lagged firm-
specific controls (log assets, cash holdings scaled by assets, and ROA); lagged department controls (GDP per capita, primary
school enrollment, a poverty index, the extension of roads in 1995, lagged FARC attacks per 100,000, and lagged homicides
per 100,000); and fixed effects (by year, industry, department, and firm). Kidnapping rates are measured at the department
level and are scaled by 100,000 population. For each type of kidnappings, we present results for two subsamples: (1) firms
whose management or owners were subject to kidnappings reported in the FONDELIBERTAD dataset (Panel A), and (2)
firms whose employees and owners were not subject to kidnappings reported in the FONDELIBERTAD dataset (Panel B).
The total sample is an unbalanced panel of firms in Colombia with annual observations from 1996 to 2003.
PANEL A:  Firms Directly Affected by Kidnappings
Dependent Variable:  Investment t / Total Assets t -1
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Firm-Related Kidnappings in the Same Industry t -1 -0.036**
(0.017)
Firm-Related Kidnappings in Other Industries t -1 -0.001
(0.001)
Homicides 0.001
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.011)
Guerrilla Attacks -0.208
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.265)
Observations 39,379
Number of firms 10,874
R-squared 0.995
Firm-Related Kidnappings of Non-Colombians -1.854
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (4.295)
Foreign Ownership 0.645
(0.578)
Firm-Related Kidnappings of     ×     ( Foreign Ownership ) -6.795**
Non-Colombians per 100,000  t -1 (3.149)
Homicides 0.003
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.011)
Guerrilla Attacks -0.238
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.250)
Observations 33,600
Number of firms 8,455
R-squared 0.316
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for department clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7:  Industry and Nationality Effects
Panel A of this table reports OLS estimates of the effect on investment of own-industry and other industries kidnappings, corresponding to
equation (3) in the text. The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms in Colombia with annual observations from 1996 to 2003. The dependent
variable is the change in Property, Plant, and Equipment scaled by lagged assets. Regressions include lagged firm-specific controls (log assets,
cash holdings scaled by assets, and ROA); lagged department controls (GDP per capita, primary school enrollment, a poverty index, the
extension of roads in 1995, FARC attacks per 100,000, and homicides per 100,000); and fixed effects (by year, industry, department, and firm).
For each 2-digit ISIC industry code department, and year, the variable Firm-Related Kidnappings in the Same Industry is the sum of
kidnappings of firm management or firm owners in that industry code but in other departments. Firm-Related Kidnappings in Other Industries
is defined as the sum of kidnappings of firm management and firm owners over all other departments and all other industries divided by the
total number of industries.  Kidnapping rates are not scaled by 100,000 population.  
Panel B reportsOLS estimatesof the effect on investment of firm-related kidnappings of non-Colombians. Victims of firm-related kidnappings
are firm owners or firm management. The estimates correspond to equation (4) in the text. The dummy variable Foreign Ownership equals 1
if foreigners own at least 50% of the firm.  Kidnapping rates are measured at the department level and are scaled by 100,000 population.
Dependent Variable:  Investment t / Total Assets t -1
PANEL A:  Kidnappings in the Same Industry vs. Kidnappings in Other Industries
Dependent Variable:  Investment t / Total Assets t -1
PANEL B:  Firm-Related Kidnappings of Colombians and Foreign Citizens
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(2) (4)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top and -1.776*
Middle Management per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.880)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top and     ×     ( Industry Tradability ) 0.043
Middle Management per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.060)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners -3.976*
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (1.957)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners     ×     ( Industry Tradability) -0.023
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.093)
Industry Tradability -0.146** -0.134**
(0.068) (0.058)
Homicides 0.003 0.002
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.011) (0.010)
Guerrilla Attacks -0.218 -0.236
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.266) (0.254)
Observations 39,190 39,190
Number of firms 10,874 10,874
R-squared 0.995 0.995
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for department clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8:  Firm-Related Kidnappings and Industry Tradability
This table reports the effect on investment of the interaction between firm-related kidnappings and industry tradability. The results
correspond to equation (5) in the text. The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms in Colombia with annual observations from 1996
to 2003. The dependent variable is the change in Property, Plant, and Equipment scaled by lagged assets. Regressions include
lagged firm controls (log assets, cash holdings scaled by assets, and ROA); lagged department controls (GDP per capita, primary
school enrollment, a poverty index, the extension of roads in 1995, guerrilla attacks per 100,000, and homicides per 100,000); and
fixed effects (by year, industry, department, and firm). We define Industry Tradability as the fraction of exportsin total sales at the
industry level; this measure of tradability is an average from 1991 to 1995. Kidnappings are measured at the department level and
scaled by 100,000 population. Firm Management includes board members, CEOs, presidents, vice-presidents, and division
managers.  Firm Owners  are victims who own at least part of the firm.    
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(1) (2)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top and -1.669
Middle Management per 100,000 pop. t -1 (1.561)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners -3.974
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (5.107)
Homicides 0.017 0.025
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.012) (0.018)
Guerrilla Attacks 0.083 0.058
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.091) (0.101)
Observations 32,894 32,894
Number of firms 10,854 10,854
R-squared 0.467 0.467
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for department clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 9:  The Effect of Violence on Firm Borrowing
This table reports OLS estimates of the effect on firm borrowing of kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla (FARC)
attacks. The dependent variable is the change in bank debt scaled by lagged assets. Regressions include lagged
firm-specific controls (log sales, cash holdings scaled by total assets, ROA, and PPE scaled by total assets), lagged
department controls (GDP per capita, primary school enrollment, a poverty index, and the extension of roads in
1995), and fixed effects (by year, industry, department, and firm). Kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks
are measured at the department level and scaled by 100,000 population. The sample is an unbalanced panel of
firms located in Colombia with annual observations from 1996 to 2003. Firm Management includes board
members, CEOs, presidents, vice-presidents, and division managers. Firm Owners are victims who own at least
part of the firm. Guerilla attacks includes FARC attacks reported by the National Police/Ministry of Defense. 
Dependent Variable:  (Bank Debt t - Bank Debt t -1)/ Total Assets t -1
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(1) (2)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top and -0.021
Middle Management per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.021)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners -0.002
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.064)
Homicides 0.0002 0.0002
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.0001) (0.0002)
Guerrilla Attacks 0.002 0.002
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 39,818 39,818
Number of firms 10,854 10,854
R-squared 0.714 0.714
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for department clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 10:  The Effect of Violence on Firms' Costs
This table reports OLS estimates of the effect on firms' administrative costs of kidnappings, homicides, and
guerrilla (FARC) attacks. The dependent variable isadministrative expensesscaled byassets. Regressions include
firm-specific controls (log assets, cash holdings scaled by assets, and sales scaled by assets); department controls
(GDP per capita, primary school enrollment, a poverty index, and the extension ofroads in 1995); industry controls
(Herfindahl index on sales); and fixed effects (by year, industry, department, and firm). Kidnappings, homicides,
and guerrilla attacks are measured by department and are scaled by 100,000 population. The sample is an
unbalanced panel of firms located in Colombia (annual observations from 1996 to 2003). Firm Management
includes board members, CEOs, presidents, vice-presidents, and division managers. Firm Owners are victims who
own at least part of the firm. Guerilla Attacks includes FARC attacks reported by the National Police/Ministry of
Defense.
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Variable Name Description Years covered Level of 
Aggregation
Source
Poverty index Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas (Unfulfilled
Basic Needs). Reflects crowded or substandard
housing conditions, schooling-age children not
attending school, and/or less than primary
education of the head of the household.
1990-2002 Municipality DANE, CEDE
GDP per capita Real GDP divided by population. GDP is
measured in constant Colombian pesos of 1994.
1990-2001 Department DANE
Paved roads in 1995 Paved roads (hundreds of squared kilometers) in
1995.
1995 Municipality DANE, CEDE
Primary school enrollment Students enrolled in primary school divided by
population between 6 and 12 years.
1993-2002 Municipality DANE, CEDE
Population Estimated total population, based on the 1993
census and annual population projections.
1990-2003 Municipality DANE
Producer price index Country-wide producer price index. 1990-2003 Country-wide DANE
Industry tradability Industry's exports divided by industry's sales.
Exports and sales are measured in current
Colombian pesos.
1991-1998  4-digit ISIC 
code 
DANE
This table summarizes department, municipality, and industry variables that are used in the empirical analysis, but are not explained in the
main body of the text. All series are annual, except for paved roads, which is observed only for 1995. DANE is the National Administrative
Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica) and CEDE is the Center for Research on Economic
Development (Centro para Estudios Sobre el Desarrollo Economico) at Universidad de Los Andes.






















Antioquia 9.30 1.05 0.09 0.52 0.27 0.10 126.87 3.33
A t l á n t i c o 1 . 0 20 . 1 40 . 0 00 . 0 10 . 0 10 . 0 1 3 0 . 2 2 0 . 0 3
Bogotá, D.C. 1.68 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 39.64 0.06
B o l í v a r 6 . 4 40 . 3 70 . 0 91 . 0 30 . 0 90 . 0 6 2 4 . 0 4 1 . 7 8
Boyacá 4.04 0.21 0.05 0.12 0.11 0.04 20.30 2.21
Caldas 4.20 0.36 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 88.10 1.16
Caquetá 14.24 0.67 0.03 1.27 3.22 0.15 107.33 11.52
C a u c a 5 . 4 00 . 2 90 . 0 70 . 8 20 . 1 80 . 1 6 4 3 . 0 2 6 . 4 3
Cesar 25.92 1.48 0.06 1.22 0.47 0.16 71.03 2.98
C ó r d o b a 1 . 6 40 . 1 00 . 0 10 . 0 40 . 0 20 . 0 0 2 7 . 7 9 0 . 5 5
Cundinamarca 8.17 0.73 0.15 0.36 0.07 0.20 40.22 6.02
Chocó 12.30 1.15 0.29 0.70 0.71 0.45 50.42 5.40
H u i l a 5 . 9 60 . 5 70 . 1 20 . 3 60 . 2 00 . 0 1 5 1 . 8 7 4 . 5 1
Guajira 13.78 1.48 0.24 1.00 0.21 0.52 61.11 4.77
Magdalena 8.87 0.64 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.13 49.73 2.54
M e t a 1 6 . 2 9 1 . 5 10 . 3 50 . 8 31 . 0 00 . 1 7 6 5 . 6 0 1 1 . 0 1
Nariño 3.06 0.11 0.02 0.85 0.31 0.03 29.64 4.19
N. de Santander 8.25 0.89 0.11 0.81 0.41 0.26 90.54 1.59
Q u i n d í o 1 . 6 10 . 1 60 . 0 20 . 0 30 . 0 30 . 0 0 6 5 . 4 3 1 . 8 8
R i s a r a l d a 4 . 1 60 . 4 60 . 0 70 . 2 50 . 0 30 . 0 4 9 9 . 0 6 2 . 5 2
S a n t a n d e r 8 . 3 10 . 7 60 . 1 00 . 5 70 . 1 60 . 1 1 4 6 . 4 6 2 . 9 2
S u c r e 9 . 3 70 . 7 70 . 0 50 . 3 70 . 1 60 . 0 5 3 1 . 4 2 2 . 7 5
Tolima 7.38 0.74 0.16 0.34 0.31 0.04 52.48 3.54
Valle del C. 4.06 0.48 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.12 92.77 1.19
Arauca 12.88 1.09 0.07 1.44 0.25 0.70 104.81 21.78
Casanare 29.20 3.14 0.30 0.69 0.20 0.18 99.36 9.81
Putumayo 5.72 0.17 0.04 0.59 0.66 0.03 65.12 10.45
A m a z o n a s 0 . 5 80 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 2 20 . 0 00 . 0 09 . 3 21 . 9 9
Guanía 3.08 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.44 35.86
Guaviare 17.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.04 0.00 115.76 31.02
Vaupés 35.82 0.00 0.00 0.53 12.90 0.00 23.32 31.86
Vichada 10.99 3.34 0.00 1.59 1.59 0.14 23.50 9.95






















Observations 224 192 192 192 192 224 224 224
Mean 8.95 0.39 0.04 0.29 0.71 0.13 58.21 7.43
Std. deviation 20.24 1.44 0.10 0.68 6.49 0.27 35.78 15.09
Std. deviation  18.21 1.30 0.09 0.59 4.65 0.22 15.55 11.85
within department
PANEL B:  Means and Standard Deviation, 1996-2002
Appendix Table 2:  Kidnappings by Year and Department
Panel A reports average rates (per 100,000 pop.) of homicides, guerrilla attacks, and kidnappings by department in Colombia from 1996 to 2002.
Panel B reports the mean and standard deviation of these variables in a panel of all 32 departments from 1996 to 2002. Data on homicides and
guerrilla attacks were obtained from the National Police/Ministry of Defense. Guerrilla attacks include only attacks perpetrated by FARC. Data on
kidnappingswere obtained from the FONDELIBERTAD dataset. Total Kidnappings are all kidnappingsreported in the FONDELIBERTAD dataset;
Government Employees include local and national government employees (judiciary, legislative, and executive branches), except the Army and
National Police. Firm-related Kidnappings correspond to kidnappings of firms' employees, owners, or contractors; Top Management includes
CEOs, presidents, vicepresidents, and board members; Top and Middle Management includes division managers and supervisors plus Top 
Management.  Annual population is projected by DANE.
PANEL A:  Average Rates by Deparment, 1996-2002 (per 100,000 pop.)
 